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作者：游客 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
2008 年 12 月 10 日
The Stock Picker's Defeat
William H. Miller spent nearly two decades building his reputation as the era's greatest mutual-fund manager. Then, over the past year, he destroyed it.
Fueled by winning bets on stocks other investors feared, Mr. Miller's Legg Mason Value Trust outperformed the broad market every year from 1991 to 2005. It's a streak no other fund manager has come close to matching.
Mr. Miller was in his element a year ago when troubles in the housing market began infecting financial markets. Working from his well-worn playbook, he snapped up American International Group Inc., Wachovia Corp., Bear Stearns Cos. and Freddie Mac. As the shares continued to fall, he argued that investors were overreacting. He kept buying.
What he saw as an opportunity turned into the biggest market crash since the Great Depression. Many Value Trust holdings were more or less wiped out. After 15 years of placing savvy bets against the herd, Mr. Miller had been trampled by it.
The financial crisis has created losers across the spectrum -- homeowners who can't afford their subprime mortgages, banks that loaned to them, investors who bought mortgage-backed securities and, as financial markets eventually crumbled, just about everyone who owned shares. But it has also brought low contrarians like Mr. Miller who had been lionized for staying a step ahead of the market. This meltdown has provided a lesson for Mr. Miller and other 'value' investors: A stock may look tantalizingly cheap, but sometimes that's for good reason.
'The thing I didn't do, from Day One, was properly assess the severity of this liquidity crisis,' Mr. Miller, 58 years old, said in an interview at Legg Mason Inc.'s Baltimore headquarters.
Mr. Miller has profited from investor panics before. But this time, he said, he failed to consider that the crisis would be so severe, and the fundamental problems so deep, that a whole group of once-stalwart companies would collapse. 'I was naive,' he said.
A year ago, his Value Trust fund had $16.5 billion under management. Now, after losses and redemptions, it has assets of $4.3 billion, according to Morningstar Inc. Value Trust's investors have lost 58% of their money over the past year, 20 percentage points worse than the decline on the Standard & Poor's 500 stock index.
These losses have wiped away Value Trust's years of market-beating performance. The fund is now among the worst-performing in its class for the last one-, three-, five- and 10-year periods, according to Morningstar.
'Why didn't I just throw my money out of the window -- and light it on fire?' says Peter Cohan, a management consultant and venture-capital investor who owns Value Trust shares. Mr. Miller's strategy, he says, 'worked for a long time, but it's broken.'
Mr. Miller's picks read like a Who's Who of the stock market's biggest losers: Washington Mutual Inc., Countrywide Financial Corp. and Citigroup Inc.
'Every decision to buy anything has been wrong,' Mr. Miller said over lunch at a private club housed inside Legg's headquarters. In the 16th-floor dining room, Mr. Miller sat with his back against the wall, a preference he says he picked up as a U.S. Army intelligence officer in the 1970s. 'It's been awful,' he said.
Mr. Miller is chairman of Legg Mason Capital Management, a group of six mutual funds. He personally oversees Value Trust and the smaller Opportunity Trust. Although Mr. Miller's group accounts for only about $28 billion of Legg Mason's $840 billion in total assets, the firm's reputation is intertwined with that of its marquee star. Legg's stock is down 75% this year. The firm's woes have weighed on private-equity firm Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., which took a $1.25 billion stake in Legg early this year.
Questions now swirl about whether Mr. Miller will quit or be replaced. He says his group's board of directors will decide whether he stays or goes, but he's not planning on calling it quits. Mark Fetting, Legg's chief executive and chairman of the board that oversees Mr. Miller's funds, said he supports Mr. Miller and his plans to improve performance.
Growing up in Florida, Bill Miller took an early interest in the market. As a high-schooler in the late 1960s, he says he invested the money he earned umpiring ba<x>seball games in stocks like RCA, making enough to buy a broken-down Ford. In the mid-1970s, in Germany during his Army stint, he visited a brokerage office in Munich to buy Intel Corp. shares. He studied philosophy in graduate school, but left to join a Pennsylvania manufacturing company where he eventually oversaw its investments. By the early 1980s, Mr. Miller's then-wife worked at Legg Mason. Through her, Mr. Miller met the brokerage's founder, Raymond 'Chip' Mason. Mr. Mason said he was thinking of starting some mutual funds. Mr. Miller jumped. He joined Legg Mason in 1981. Value Trust launched in 1982, with Mr. Miller as co-manager.
In 1984, Mr. Miller paid a visit to influential Fidelity Investments manager Peter Lynch, who suggested Mr. Miller take a look at Fannie Mae. Much like today, the mortgage company had a portfolio full of troubled loans. Traders were betting it would go bust.
Mr. Miller found Fannie's case compelling: The bad loans would soon roll off its books, he recalls, the government-backed company would be able to borrow at preferred rates and its low cost structure could make it hugely profitable. 'Is this thing really trading at only two times what it's going to earn in three or four years?' Mr. Miller recalls asking Mr. Lynch in a follow-up phone call.
Mr. Miller figures that by the time he sold out of Fannie in 2005, he had made 50 times his money.
Such all-or-nothing bets would come to define Mr. Miller's style. He usually holds about three dozen stocks at a time, compared with a hundred or so in a typical mutual-fund portfolio. He has welcomed negative sentiment about companies, which has let him buy stocks as their prices fall, 'averaging down' the per-share price he pays. The strategy can net him big stakes in companies -- an enviable position if shares rally and a sticky one if he needs to sell.
When asked how he would know he made a mistake in buying a falling stock, Mr. Miller once retorted: 'When we can no longer get a quote.' In other words, the only price at which he was unwilling to buy more was zero.
Mr. Miller's swing-for-the-fences approach makes even other value investors flinch. Christopher Davis, a friend of Mr. Miller's and a money manager at Davis Funds, recalls discussing his investment strategy with Mr. Miller in the early 1990s. 'One of my goals is to just be right more than I'm wrong,' Mr. Davis recalls telling Mr. Miller.
''That's really stupid,'' Mr. Miller countered, according to Mr. Davis. 'Bill said, 'What matters is how much you make when you're right. If you're wrong nine times out of 10 and your stocks go to zero -- but the tenth one goes up 20 times -- you'll be just fine,'' Mr. Davis recalls. 'I just can't live like that.'
During the savings-and-loan crisis in 1990 and 1991, Mr. Miller loaded up on American Express Corp., mortgage giant Freddie Mac and struggling banks and brokerages. Financials eventually made up more than 40% of his portfolio.
He looked wrong at first. But these stocks eventually propelled Value Trust to the top of the performance charts. In 1996, Value Trust gained 38%, outpacing the S&P 500 by more than 15 percentage points. By then, Mr. Miller was loading up on AOL, computer makers and other out-of-favor tech stocks.
His good bets more than made up for the bad. Between 1998 and 2002, 10 stocks in the Value Trust portfolio lost 75% or more. Three, including Enron and WorldCom, went bankrupt.
As his winning streak grew, Mr. Miller's name was often proceeded in press reports with the word 'legendary.' He was mentioned alongside the likes of Fidelity's Mr. Lynch. Legg Mason, meanwhile, grew from a regional brokerage house into one of the planet's largest money managers.
In 1999, he cut an unusually lucrative deal with Legg Mason to take the reins of Opportunity Trust, a new fund. The fund's management fees went to an entity half-owned by Mr. Miller. From 2005 through 2007, Opportunity Trust paid the entity $137 million. In 2006, he bought a 235-foot yacht, 'Utopia.'
Investing is Mr. Miller's obsession, friends say. On visits to Manhattan, he convenes chief executives, stock analysts and other money managers for steak dinner at the Post House to discuss investment ideas. His yacht aside, these friends say, Mr. Miller pays little attention to wealth's trappings: His work shoes are a pair of black loafers, purchased at Nordstrom, that he gets resoled again and again.
In 2006, Mr. Miller's outperformance streak finally broke when he missed out on big gains in energy stocks. His performance suffered again in early 2007, thanks to losses in home-building stocks he had bought following signs of trouble in the real-estate market.
In the early summer of 2007, two Bear Stearns hedge funds that made big bets on low-quality mortgages imploded. The stock market whipsawed in July and August, as investors worried that housing-market troubles could spread.
Mr. Miller thought investors were too pessimistic about the housing and credit markets. In the third quarter, he bought Bear Stearns. In the fourth quarter, as financial stocks fell, he took positions in Merrill Lynch & Co., Washington Mutual, Wachovia and Freddie Mac.
Explaining his moves to his shareholders in a fourth-quarter update, he compared the period to 1989-90, when he had also bought beaten-down banks. 'Sometimes market patterns recur that you believe you have seen before,' he wrote. 'Financials appear to have bottomed.'
In 2008, Mr. Miller continued to accumulate Bear Stearns. At a conference on Friday, March 14, he boasted that he had bought just that morning at a bargain price, north of $30 a share -- down from a recent high of $154.
Bear Stearns collapsed that weekend. In a takeover brokered by the Federal Reserve, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. acquired the storied investment house in a deal that first valued it at $2 a share.
Mr. Miller and his team spent the following days and evenings trying to figure out what had gone wrong. Mr. Miller, who also owns J.P. Morgan shares, says he called J.P. Morgan Chief Executive Jamie Dimon to run his Bear Stearns valuations past him.
Mr. Miller says the conversation with Bear Stearns's new owner left him satisfied that he'd fairly valued the investment house's troubled mortgage holdings. But his team had missed Bear Stearns's vulnerability to a 'run on the bank' collapse: The heavily leveraged firm was borrowing huge sums to function day-to-day, and when lenders walked away, it collapsed. Mr. Miller says he was also surprised that the Federal Reserve would play an active role in a transaction that would let stockholders be largely wiped out.
Mr. Miller worried that Wachovia and Washington Mutual were vulnerable to a similar squeeze on capital. He sold both.
But he didn't abandon financials. During the second quarter, he added to Freddie Mac and insurer AIG. In an April letter to shareholders, he wrote that the rebounding stock and bond markets suggested a corner had been turned. 'The credit panic ended with the collapse of Bear Stearns,' he wrote. 'By far the worst is behind us.' By the end of June, Mr. Miller's group held 53 million Freddie shares -- about 8% of the company.
Financial stocks continued to fall though the spring and summer. Many value investors, such as John Rogers at Ariel Investments, sold or at least stopped buying the sector.
With Freddie and Fannie under particular pressure, some at Legg Mason Capital Management were worried that group-think had set in. 'There were hedge-fund guys out there arguing that Fannie and Freddie were going to zero,' said Sam Peters, a fund manager in Mr. Miller's group.
Mr. Peters, whose fund also owned Freddie Mac, suggested putting together a team of Legg research analysts to argue the case against Freddie. In early-August meetings devoted to the mortgage giant, the so-called 'Red Team' said Freddie may need to raise substantial capital, which would massively dilute existing stockholders' shares.
Mr. Peters stopped accumulating Freddie shares. Mr. Miller kept buying them for his Opportunity Trust portfolio.
The risk, as Mr. Miller saw it, was that the housing market could perform worse than he expected. But he dismissed talk that the government could nationalize Freddie and Fannie. He took comfort in Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson's mid-July statement that the government was focused on supporting the agencies in their 'current form.' If anything, he believed, Freddie would recapture market share as private-sector competitors failed. By the end of August, declines in AIG and Freddie left Value Trust down 33% over the previous 12 months -- 21 percentage points worse than the S&P 500 over the same period. Mr. Mason, Legg's founder, received complaints from brokers about Mr. Miller. Mr. Fetting, Legg's chief executive, fielded questions about whether Mr. Miller would be replaced.
The news got worse on the weekend of Sept. 6 and 7. The Treasury announced it was taking over Fannie and Freddie, rendering private shareholders' stakes nearly worthless. On Monday, shares in Freddie, which had started the year at $34 and entered the weekend at $5, were trading at less than $1. A government takeover was the one outcome for which Mr. Miller hadn't prepared.
He realized then that his old playbook had failed him. He began to bail out of AIG, which insured the debt of many troubled financial firms. How could his group managers invest in financials if 'we don't know the rules,' Mr. Peters remembers him saying.
In September, the Baltimore police and fire retirement pension board reportedly fired Mr. Miller from their $2.2 billion fund. A representative for the board did not return calls seeking comment.
Mr. Miller and his staff, who invest alongside shareholders in their funds, have also felt the pain. For the first time, Mr. Miller's group fired staff, an experience he calls 'devastating.' Mr. Miller won't disclose his personal worth or losses.
The fund manager says he's adjusting his stock-picking screens for a new world, in which he expects investors to be risk-averse for several years. He's re-reading a biography of John Maynard Keynes, focusing on the famed economist's experience as a money manager during the 1930s. He says he's scouring markets for industry-leading companies with big dividends. He thinks there are also opportunities in battered corporate bonds.
But improving performance will take a long time, he says. 'I can't accelerate it.'
Mr. Miller notes that in the final years of his winning streak, people often asked him why he didn't quit while he was ahead. Asked over lunch whether he wished he had stepped aside then, he looked out the window, over Baltimore's Inner Harbor. 'That would have been a really smart thing to have done,' he said, adding he has no plans to step aside.
'The idea of him retiring to the Riviera just isn't him,' says his friend, Mr. Davis. 'The money has meaning, but the record is a lot more meaningful.'
Mr. Davis continued: 'He wants to win.'
Tom Lauricella
金牌基金经理遭遇滑铁卢
在共同基金行业摸爬滚打近二十年后，米勒(William H. Miller)为自己打造了这个时代最出色共同基金经理人的声誉。然而，就在过去短短一年时间里，这个荣誉就被他毁掉了。
由于在其他投资人不敢涉足的股票上屡屡斩获，米勒所在的Legg Mason价值型信托基金(Legg Mason Value Trust)在1991-2005年期间年年跑赢大盘，这一成就让其他任何一位基金经理人都难以望其项背。
一年前，当住房市场危机开始影响金融市场的时候，米勒迎来了施展身手的机会。他从自己烂熟于心的股票里挑选了美国国际集团(American International Group)、Wachovia Corp.、贝尔斯登(Bear Stearns Cos.)和房地美(Freddie Mac.)。当这些股票连连下跌的时候，他认为投资者反应过度了。他还在买进。
他本以为那次危机是一次大好的赚钱机会，结果危机却变成大萧条之后最惨重的市场溃败。许多价值型信托基金或多或少都大伤元气。虽然15年来他与大众反向操作的决定都证明是明智的，但这次却栽了。
金融危机让各种类型的投资者都一败涂地，从负担不起次级按揭的房主、贷款给他们的银行到按揭抵押证券的买家……而随着金融市场最终一蹶不振，几乎所有持有股票的人都在吐血。但它也让类似米勒这样因为总能领先市场一步而被奉为偶像的反向操作派大受打击。这次重创给米勒和其他“价值”投资者带来了教训，那就是：某只股票或许看上去便宜得不可思议，但有时那是有充分理由的。
今年58岁的米勒在巴尔的摩Legg Mason Inc.总部接受采访时说，从一开始我就没能恰当地估计到这场流动性危机的严重性。
米勒以前曾从市场恐慌中赚钱。但他说，这次他没想到危机会这么严重，基本面的问题如此之深，以至于曾贵为市场领头羊的优质上市公司居然统统倒下了。“我还是缺乏经验”，他说。
据晨星公司(Morningstar Inc.)的数据，一年前，他的价值型信托基金管理着165亿美元资产，现在，连亏损带资金赎回，只剩下43亿美元。价值型信托基金的投资者过去一年共损失了58%，比标普500指数跌幅高20个百分点。
这些损失让米勒的价值型基金多年来好于大盘的表现被一笔勾销。据晨星的数据，该基金目前在同类基金的最近1年、3年、5年和10年期业绩表上均排在最末档。
管理顾问及风险资本投资人、持有该基金的科恩(Peter Cohan)说，我当初怎么不索性将钱扔出窗外，然后点火烧掉呢？他说，米勒的投资策略一向奏效，但这次失灵了。
米勒的选股清单就像是这次股市的“烈士榜”，上面有：华盛顿互助银行（Washington Mutual Inc.)、全国金融股份有限公司（Countrywide Financial Corp.）和花旗集团(Citigroup Inc.)等。
米勒在Legg总部大楼里一家私人俱乐部吃午餐时说，“每一个买进股票的决定都是错的”。在位于16楼的餐厅里，米勒背靠墙坐着。他说，这是他七十年代在美国陆军情报部门工作时养成的习惯。“真是可怕，”他说。
米勒是Legg Mason Capital Management的董事长，该部门旗下有6只共同基金。他本人负责其中的价值型信托基金和规模较小的机会信托基金(Opportunity Trust)。虽然米勒所在部门管理的资产额在Legg Mason的8,400亿美元中仅占约280亿美元，但Legg Mason的声誉跟它的这位金牌大明星紧密相联。Legg的股票今年下跌了75%。它的困境对股权投资公司Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co.造成了影响，后者今年早些时候购买了Legg价值12.5亿美元的股份。
现在的问题是，米勒是否会离开Legg或被别人取代。他说，他所在部门的董事会将决定他是去是留，但他还没想要洗手不干。Legg首席执行长、在监管米勒所在基金的董事会担任董事长的菲廷(Mark Fetting)说，他支持米勒和他的业绩改善计划。
在佛罗里达长大的米勒很早就对市场产生了兴趣。他说，六十年代末还在上高中时，他就将做棒球比赛裁判挣到的钱投资了RCA等股票，从股票上赚到的钱足够他买一辆破旧的福特车。七十年代中期，他在陆军服役时在德国呆过，当时他曾到慕尼黑一家经纪公司买过英特尔(Intel Corp.)的股票。他在研究院时读的是哲学，但离开那里后他进了宾夕法尼亚一家制造企业，最后在那里负责投资业务。八十年代初，米勒当时的妻子在 Legg Mason工作。通过她，米勒结识了Legg Mason创始人梅森(Raymond "Chip" Mason)。梅森跟他说，正在考虑发起几家基金。米勒欣然表示愿意加盟。1981年米勒进入Legg Mason。他现在所在的这家价值型信托基金成立于1982年，米勒是其联席经理人。
1984年，米勒拜访了Fidelity Investments深具影响力的基金经理彼得•林奇(Peter Lynch)，后者建议米勒关注房利美(Fannie Mae)。当时这家抵押贷款公司的投资组合中持有的全是问题贷款，同如今的情况很相似。交易员断定房利美将会倒闭。
米勒发现房利美的情况很值得关注：他回忆说，不良贷款很快会从其账面上消失，这家有政府背景的公司能够以优惠利率获得贷款，其低成本的结构将带来巨大利润。米勒记得在之后打给林奇的电话中问道，这家公司基于未来三到四年盈利的市盈率真的只有两倍吗？
米勒称，到他2005年卖出房利美时，他的投资增长了50倍。这种孤注一掷的做法显示出米勒的投资风格。他同一时期通常持有三、四十只股票，而一般的共同基金投资组合中大多拥有约100只股票。他喜欢看到对一些公司的负面看法，这可以让他在股价下跌时买进，从而拉低平均买进价格。这种策略会让他持有大量股份，这一点在股价上涨时让人羡慕，而需要脱手时就比较麻烦。
当有人问道他是怎么知道错误地买进了还要下跌的股票时，米勒曾回应道，当我们不再能获得报价时。换言之，他不愿意加码买进的唯一价格就是零。
米勒这种不成功则成仁的做法甚至令其他价值型投资者也感到畏惧。米勒的朋友、Davis Funds基金经理克里斯托弗•戴维斯(Christopher Davis)回忆说，曾在90年代初同米勒讨论过他的投资策略。当时他告诉米勒：我的一个目标是正确的次数超过犯错的次数。
据戴维斯回忆，米勒回击说，这样很愚蠢。米勒称，真正有意义的是你正确的时候能赚多少。如果你10次错了9次，股票变得一钱不值，但只要第十次上涨了20倍，你就够了。戴维斯说，我可做不到这点。
在1990和1991年的储蓄及房屋贷款危机中，米勒大量买进了美国运通公司(American Express Corp.)、抵押贷款巨头房地美和陷入困境的银行及经纪公司的股票。金融类股最终在他的投资组合中占到了40%以上。
那次他似乎首次出现了失误。但这些股票最终推动价值型信托基金跃居业绩榜的首位。1996年，该基金增值38%，比标准普尔500指数的涨幅高出15个百分点以上。那时，米勒又买进了美国在线(AOL)、电脑生产商和其它失宠的科技类股。
他判断正确所获得的收益超过了失误带来的损失。在1998年至2002年，价值型信托基金的投资组合中有10只股票的跌幅超过75%。包括安然(Enron)和WorldCom在内的三家公司则破产了。
随着成功投资案例的不断增多，米勒在媒体报导中常被冠以“传奇人物”。人们常常将他与Fidelity的林奇等人相提并论。与此同时，Legg Mason则从一家地区性经纪机构发展成为全球最大的基金公司之一。
1999 年，他同Legg Mason达成了一项利润格外丰厚的交易，取得了新基金机会信托基金的控股权。这只基金的管理费归米勒持有一半股份的一家机构所得。从2005年到 2007年，机会信托基金向该机构支付了1.37亿美元。2006年，他购买了235英尺长的游艇“乌托邦”号(Utopia)。
朋友们说，米勒对投资非常痴迷。当来到曼哈顿时，他召集首席执行长、股票分析师和其他基金经理在一起吃牛排，讨论投资创意。这些朋友说，除了他的游艇外，米勒对财富的象征并不在意：他上班时总穿着在Nordstrom购买的一双已经换了好几次鞋底的黑皮鞋。
2006年，由于错过了能源类股的飙升，米勒一向强于同行的业绩最终终结。由于在房地产市场出现危险征兆后买进房屋建筑类股造成的亏损，他2007年初的表现依然不好。
2007年夏初，贝尔斯登(Bear Stearns)的两只大量投资劣质抵押贷款的对冲基金爆发了内部危机。由于投资者担心房屋市场的麻烦会进一步扩散，股市在7、8月份大幅下挫。
米勒认为投资者对房屋和信贷市场过于悲观了。三季度，他买进了贝尔斯登。到四季度，随着金融类股的下跌，他又买进了美林(Merrill Lynch & Co.)、华盛顿互助银行、Wachovia和房地美。
四季度向股东解释他的举动时，米勒认为情况同1989-90年时类似。当时他也买进了大幅下挫的银行类股。他写道，有时市场会重现你认为在以前见过的模式。金融类股看来已经触底。
2008年，米勒继续增持贝尔斯登。在3月14日（周五）的一次会议上，他宣称当天上午刚以非常划算的价格买进了该股，每股只有30多美元，低于154美元的近期高点。
但那个周末贝尔斯登就破产了。在美国联邦储备委员会(Federal Reserve)撮合的交易中，摩根大通(J.P.Morgan Chase & Co.)收购了这家知名的投资公司，最初的报价仅为每股2美元。
在接下来的几天里，米勒和他的团队日夜奋战想弄明白哪里出了错。同时持有摩根大通股份的米勒说，他打电话给摩根大通的首席执行长戴蒙(Jamie Dimon)，跟他讲了自己对贝尔斯登的估值，并且征询了他的意见。
米勒说，与贝尔斯登新东家的谈话让他很满意，因为这证实了他对该公司的问题抵押贷款资产的估值是合理的。不过，他的团队却漏算了贝尔斯登因银行挤兑而崩溃的可能：这家负债累累的公司大量借钱用来维持日常运营，当放贷商走开之后，它也就崩溃了。米勒说，他对美联储会促成一桩令股东损失惨重的买卖也颇感意外。
米勒担心，Wachovia和华盛顿互助银行也可能发生类似的资金紧张局面。所以他把手中这两家公司的股票都卖掉了。
但是他并没有彻底放弃金融类股。第二季度，他增持了房地美和保险巨头AIG。在4月份发给股东的一封信中，他写道，股市和债市反弹显示形势已经是柳暗花明了。他写道，信贷恐慌随着贝尔斯登的崩溃而结束了；如今，我们已经渡过了最糟糕的时候。截至6月底，米勒的团队持有5,300万股房地美股票，约占该公司总股份的8%.
春夏两季，金融类股都在持续下跌。很多价值投资者都卖掉，或者至少是停止买进金融类股了，比如Ariel Investments的约翰•罗杰斯(John Rogers)。
由于房地美和房利美的压力尤其大，Legg Mason Capital Management的一些人担心，群体思维开始露头了。米勒团队中的一位基金经理山姆•彼得斯(Sam Peters)说，有些对冲基金经理称房利美和房地美会变得一钱不值。
彼得斯的基金也持有房地美的股份，他建议将Legg的研究分析师们召集起来组成一个小组，讨论房地美的问题。在8月初有关房地美的会议上，所谓的“红队”说，房地美可能需要筹措大量资金，进而严重稀释现有股东的股份。
彼得斯停止增持房地美股份。而米勒还在继续为他的机会信托投资组合买进该股。
米勒认为，风险只是住房市场可能比他预期的表现更差。不过他没有理会政府可能会接管房地美和房利美的说法。他从财政部长鲍尔森(Henry Paulson)7月中旬发表的讲话中找到了安慰，鲍尔森表示政府正专注于以现有形式支持“两房”。他认为，随着私营领域竞争者的倒闭，房地美只可能赢回更多的市场份额。截至8月底，AIG和房地美股价的下滑使价值信托基金较去年同期缩水33%，比同期标普500指数下降幅度高21个百分点。Legg的创始人梅森收到了经纪商对米勒的投诉。还有人向该公司首席执行长菲廷提出过米勒是否会被替换的问题。
在9月6日和7日这个周末，传来的消息更加糟糕了。财政部宣布将接管房利美和房地美，令私人股东的持股几乎一文不值。周一，房地美股票的跌至不足1美元。该股年初时的股价为34美元，周末前的价格为5美元。政府的接管是米勒未曾料到的一个结果。
随后他意识到，他的传统强项让他遭遇了滑铁卢。他开始救助AIG──该公司承保了许多陷入困境的金融公司的债券。彼得斯记得米勒曾说，如果我们不了解规则，他公司的经理怎么能投资金融类股呢。
9月份，巴尔的摩警察及消防人员退休基金董事会宣布解聘米勒对其22亿美元基金的管理。该董事会的代表没有回复要求置评的电话。
米勒和手下的员工也感到了痛苦。他们也都同股东一道投资了公司的基金。米勒的公司也首次开始解雇员工，他称这是“灾难性”的经历。米勒没有披露他的个人盈亏。
米勒说，他调整了他的选股系统以迎接新世界的到来，他预计投资者在几年内都会倾向于规避风险。他正重新阅读约翰•梅纳德•凯恩斯(John Maynard Keynes)的传记，将重点放在这位著名的经济学家上世纪30年代时担任基金经理时的经历。他说，他在从市场上寻找高股息的行业领先公司。他认为受到重创的公司债券也存在机会。
但他说，提高基金的业绩需要很长时间。我不能急功近利。
米勒指出，在他保持连胜记录的最后几年里，人们常常问他为什么没有急流勇退。在午餐时被问到是否希望当时能够隐退时，他望向窗外的巴尔的摩的内港。他说，这的确应该是很明智的事情。不过他补充说，他并不打算退位。
他的朋友戴维斯说，如果他有退休隐居的想法，那他就不是米勒了。金钱固然有意义，但创造纪录要有意义得多。
戴维斯说，他想的只是获胜。
Tom Lauricella
本文涉及股票或公司
美盛集团
英文名称：Legg Mason Inc.
总部地点：美国
上市地点：纽约证交所
股票代码：LM
作者：游客 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
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