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 雷曼宣布破产后总裁在健身房内遭暴打 |
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成也萧何，败也萧何 -- 游客 - (2058 Byte) 2008-10-09 周四, 00:19 (638 reads) |
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作者：游客 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
2008年10月07日13:30
雷曼兄弟控股公司(Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.)在崩溃前的几周里竭力掩饰自己正在飞速滑向金融悬崖。
这家陷入困境的证券公司悄悄地把欧洲央行和美国联邦储备委员会(Fed)当作它财务上的救命稻草。9月10日，雷曼在电话会议上向投资者保证自己根本不需要新的资本，而此前一天雷曼的管理人员刚刚计算出公司需要至少30亿美元新鲜资本。雷曼认为其庞大的房地产投资组合估值合理，但业内管理人士说其投资组合估值过高，高出了逾100亿美元。在对冲基金客户开始从雷曼撤出资金之时，雷曼向他们保证说自己的财务状况良好。
9 月11日，摩根大通(J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.)终止了雷曼伪装强大的努力。作为雷曼及其客户之间的中间人，摩根大通比大多数外人更了解雷曼的困境，而且不喜欢自己看到的情形。知情人士说，摩根大通再次提出了一周前没有得到满足的要求，要求雷曼提供50亿美元的额外抵押品－－即容易出售的证券，为摩根大通客户所持的雷曼贷款头寸提供保护。
这真可谓釜底抽薪。50亿美元的抵押品要求，加上雷曼的对冲基金客户大量撤资，令这家有着158年历史的华尔街老店元气大伤，不得不在4天后申请破产保护。
在信贷危机期间，金融公司夹存于各种相互冲突的压力之间：既要将痛苦的真*相告知公众，又要避免引发恐慌。《华尔街日报》根据证券申报文件、破产法庭文件以及对事件参与者的20多次访谈写成这个雷曼不顾一切求生存的故事，首次披露雷曼为自救付出了多大的努力。这家公司进行的幕后操纵令人怀疑它是否越过了正常的界限，误导了客户和投资者。
投资银行的生存在非常大的程度上依赖于信任－－贷款机构和投资者的信任、对冲基金和其他大客户的信任，尤其是作为交易对手方的其他大银行的信任。投资银行的业务十分复杂，其资产负债表极其庞大且不透明，局外人很难确知一家公司的问题有多严重。但一旦他们感觉到一家公司出了问题，就会很快逃离。
众议院监管和政府改革委员会(U.S. House Oversight and Government Reform Committee)周一将举行听证会，审查导致雷曼申请破产的监管失误和金融过度问题。雷曼首席执行长理查德·福尔德(Richard Fuld Jr.)将在听证会上作证。
FBI调查
美国联邦调查局(FBI)已经就雷曼或其管理人员是否因向投资者谎报公司状况而涉嫌欺诈展开初步调查。知悉调查内情的人士称，纽约东区的美国联邦检察官办公室(U.S. Attorney's office)的检察官们也在调查雷曼管理人员是否在9月10日向投资者和研究分析师们夸大其辞，从而误导投资者－－5天以后该公司就申请了破产保护。
前任检察官们说，严重的金融危机会让投资银行的管理人员处境艰难，因为对他们来说，维护客户信心至关重要。
曾任美国司法部和美国证券交易委员会(Securities and Exchange Commission)律师、现为韦恩州立大学(Wayne State University)法学院教师的赫宁(Peter Henning)说，如果你的公司是建立在信任基础上的，而你不能显示出软弱，所有的管理人员都必须在这两者之间找平衡点。但刑事检察官们将安然公司 (Enron Corp.)的声明作为其管理人员误导投资者的证据。看起来好像你好象是见什么人说什么话。
雷曼的崩溃是持续13个月的信贷危机中的决定性事件。政府决定不救助雷曼，令全球投资者和贷款机构产生恐慌，迫使美国推出了史无前例的金融体系救助计划。
整个夏季，福尔德都承受着巨大的压力，要补充因不断加剧的房地产相关损失而耗尽的资金。8月，随着投资者压低雷曼的股价，雷曼面临困境的传言开始流传。
知情人士称，福尔德和手下的银行家接触了美国银行(Bank of America Corp.)、大都会保险(MetLife Inc.)、英国的汇丰控股(HSBC Holdings PLC)、代表迪拜酋长谢赫·穆罕默德·本·拉希德·阿勒马克图姆(Sheik Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum)的投资者, 以及中国主要的主权财富基金中投公司(China Investment Corp.)。这些努力都无果而终。上述银行的发言人都不予置评或联系不上。
危机加深
随着信贷危机的加深，Fed向投行提供了新的贷款安排。尽管Fed不会透露具体的借款者，但市场通常能够判断出来，借款投行的形象也会因此蒙上污点。一位知情人士称，雷曼兄弟夏季时并未这样做，因为该行不想被视为要靠Fed的资金度日。
雷曼兄弟选择了其他途径，从欧洲央行获得了借款。这笔借款至少有一部分是通过其在法兰克福的业务部门获得的，因此没有引起市场的注意。在雷曼兄弟申请破产保护时，它的欠款约在80亿至90亿欧元之间。欧洲央行的发言人拒绝就此置评。
随着对雷曼兄弟的担忧在市场上扩散开来，该公司的高管开始接到客户的来电。没有人希望在雷曼兄弟可能申请破产保护的情况下让自己的钱陷到该公司之中。雷曼兄弟欧洲抵押贷款业务高级副总裁克里斯蒂安·劳雷斯(Christian Lawless)说，他接到了投资者的大量电话，纷纷要求撤出资产。他回忆曾向一些情绪激动的客户表示，你们这些人都是金融专业人士，我们的资产负债状况比任何时候都要好。
9月初，雷曼持有股份的伦敦大型对冲基金GLG Partners越来越对雷曼兄弟感到担忧。在一连串的电话中，福尔德和雷曼的其他高管都安抚GLG的管理层说雷曼能够生存下来。但这只对冲基金的经理决定从雷曼兄弟撤出更多资产。在此前的几个月里，他们一直在减少对雷曼兄弟的投资。
临近劳工节时，雷曼兄弟从韩国产业银行(Korea Development Bank)融资的努力宣告破灭。9月9日这一消息透露后，雷曼兄弟的股价暴跌了45%，为有史以来的最大单日跌幅。
要求抵押品
雷曼兄弟的债券评级依然很高，不过，摩根大通却越来越感到担忧。作为雷曼兄弟的“清算行”，摩根大通充当着雷曼及其客户之间的金融中间人。摩根大通旗下投行的联席首席执行长史蒂文·布莱克(Steven Black)在那天午饭后就致电福尔德。他对福尔德说，为了保护公司自身以及其客户，摩根大通要求提供50亿美元的额外抵押品－－在摩根大通5天前提出、雷曼兄弟尚未支付的50亿美元抵押品之外。
福尔德说服布莱克将价码降到30亿美元，而此前50亿美元的要求仍然悬而未决。布莱克派了两名摩根大通的投资银行家前去讨论融资计划。
与此同时，雷曼兄弟的管理人员安排在次日召开电话会议，提前宣布收益，并披露重组计划。当晚同外部银行家进行了有关融资可能性的讨论，但没有达成任何正式计划。这些银行家建议雷曼兄弟不要举行电话会议，他们警告说市场上有很多有关该公司金融状况的公开质疑。
据一位知情人士透露，当晚，雷管兄弟的高管讨论了2009年年初之前融资30亿至50亿美元以改善资本金的必要性。这位人士称，讨论融资必要性的文件曾在公司高管中传阅。
次日（9月10日）清晨，雷曼兄弟召开了投资者电话会议。该公司宣布将出现其历史上最大规模的季度亏损──39亿美元，这主要是由于房地产估值的下降。福尔德说，该公司打算出售旗下投资管理业务的多数股份，并降低股息。
雷曼兄弟的管理人员只字未提需要筹资的事情。
据会议记录显示，德意志银行(Deutsche Bank AG)分析师梅奥(Mike Mayo)问到，根据计划雷曼兄弟是否需要筹资40亿美元。雷曼兄弟首席财务长劳伊特(Ian Lowitt)回答说，我们感觉不必筹集那么多的额外资金。他还提到说，我们目前的资本状况很强劲。
福尔德和劳伊特均拒绝置评。一位雷曼兄弟的高管说，该公司在前一晚上决定无需筹集更多的资金，因为该公司希望通过出售更多的资产筹资。
次日，也就是9月11日前，雷曼兄弟信用违约掉期(CDS)的价格──1,000万美元债务损失的5年保险成本──从5月底的每年21.9万美元飙升至80万美元.。客户开始打电话、发电子邮件给雷曼兄弟要求撤资。雷曼兄弟努力满足他们的要求，以免暴露自己的疲弱之态。
不过摩根大通担心如果雷曼兄弟倒闭了，持有该公司的贷款头寸会有麻烦。摩根大通经纪自营业务负责人罗索(Jane Buyers Russo)打电话给雷曼兄弟的资金部主管托鲁西(Paolo Tonucci)。她告诉托鲁西说，雷曼兄弟必须提供摩根大通几天前要求的50亿美元的担保。
满足这项要求暂时冻结了雷曼兄弟的电脑化交易系统，几乎令该公司没有足够的资本来为交易等业务提供资金。
现在雷曼兄弟的无抵押债权人说，摩根大通帮助引发了一场流动性危机。摩根大通则说这是毫无根据的臆测。
密切关注雷曼兄弟的Fed官员看到放贷机构和客户纷纷撤退。他们越来越担心雷曼兄弟难逃此劫。
9月12日，周五。当天下午，信用评级公司警告说，如果雷曼兄弟没有筹集到新的资金，它们周一将下调该公司的债务评级。
在雷曼兄弟内部，恐慌情绪不断加剧。太多的客户打电话要求撤资，以致于雷曼兄弟无法适当地处理这些请求。该公司的现金管理系统无法应付激增的撤资要求。该系统每天从伦敦等分支机构收回现金，次日再重新发放出去。雷曼兄弟的纽约业务部门无法恰当地把钱转入伦敦的帐户上，使得该公司位于伦敦的主要欧洲分支机构周一前基本陷入瘫痪。据普华永道(PriceWaterhouseCoopers)估计，本应转入雷曼兄弟伦敦业务或其交易对手的50多亿美元周一前没有到帐。普华永道受聘帮助分析雷曼兄弟问题。
撑过周末
Fed官员与雷曼兄弟高管在该公司总部联手确定哪些资产尚未担保给其他放贷机构，能用来作为抵押品申请Fed贷款。官员们希望帮助该公司撑到周末。据几位知情人士透露，雷曼兄弟从Fed申请到约300亿美元的隔夜贷款，周六前要还清贷款。而雷曼兄弟的一位高管说，该公司当时没有向Fed贷款。
纽约联邦储备银行安排进行紧急谈判，从周五晚间开始，当时雷曼兄弟董事会忙着向Lazard Ltd.的银行家们征询意见。雷曼兄弟希望能达成一项协议，将自己卖给美国银行或是巴克莱集团(Barclays PLC)。不过，该公司的律师周五深夜就开始准备申请破产保护的文件，以备不时之需。
纽约联邦储备银行召集华尔街人士，请他们一起为雷曼兄弟摆脱困境出谋划策。巴克莱和美国银行都对购买雷曼兄弟商业地产业务不感兴趣。美联储又让多家公司（包括高盛和瑞士信贷等）人士对雷曼兄弟的大量商业地产资产进行估价，并考虑每家公司出资数十亿美元收购它。
据几位当时在场的人说，这些人对雷曼兄弟商业地产部门首席执行长沃什(Mark Walsh）不停发问。他们想知道为什么雷曼兄弟没对其326亿美元的商业地产资产进行更大规模的减记。根据规定，证券公司要对他们的资产按照当下的市值进行估价，即所谓“按市价计值”。
这些人看了雷曼兄弟的帐目后，对其房地产资产的高额估价感到意外。其中两位华尔街人士说，他们认为雷曼兄弟对它们的估价大约比它们应有的价值高出35%。
雷曼兄弟的部分欧洲房地产贷款特别让人担心。据《华尔街日报》了解到的文件内容，雷曼兄弟对部分欧洲房地产贷款相关证券的估价高达面值的97.9%。该公司对类似的美国资产的估价是面值的56%。尽管欧洲此类证券市场略好于美国，但也受到了信贷危机的冲击。
这些估价对雷曼兄弟的数千债权人来说非常重要。雷曼兄弟共欠他们数百亿美元的债务。这些债权人可以持有那些地产作为抵押，也可能希望把它卖掉。根据最近通过的救助计划，它们或许可以卖给联邦政府。
雷曼兄弟相信，它对房地产资产的估价是恰当的。首席财务长劳伊特在9月10日的电话会议上表示，雷曼兄弟近期出售的地产资产与市值水平是相符的。
到了9月14日、周日，Fed官员认为对雷曼兄弟已经无计可施。巴克莱和美国银行都不愿达成交易，除非政府同意提供交易所需资金，而这几乎肯定要动用纳税人的钱。财政部长鲍尔森(Henry Paulson)坚持表示他不会做这样的交易，而Fed官员也觉得他们没有义务单独这么做。在此同时，保险巨头美国国际集团(AIG)也难以支撑下去了。
一天傍晚，纽约联邦储备银行和其他部门官员在与雷曼兄弟人士及公司律师召开的会议中传达了这样的信息：雷曼兄弟必须申请破产。
雷曼兄弟随后与破产事务律师米勒(Harvey Miller)一起，在大约5个小时之内准备好了申请文件。周日午夜刚过，雷曼兄弟提交了破产申请。
雷曼兄弟按揭部门管理人士劳雷斯在当晚给客户发送的邮件中写道：业务在短短几周内被摧毁，语言已不能表达悲哀。但我想向你们保证，我们将以这样或那样的比以前更强大的形式重新回来。
破产导致数百亿美元的现金和证券资产陷入一片混乱，这些资产是雷曼兄弟机构经纪业务部门的数百对冲基金客户委托的投资。该部门向对冲基金出借资金和股票，并帮它们处理交易事项。D.E. Shaw & Co.和Och-Ziff Capital Management等一些世界最知名的对冲基金都拥有与雷曼兄弟及其子公司有关的资产。
普华永道(PricewaterhouseCoopers)合伙人洛马斯(Tony Lomas)说，我曾目睹过一些非常重大和艰难的形势，但从没见过这样的情形。
周一，未参加申请破产保护的雷曼兄弟经纪－交易部门从Fed针对投资银行的特别贷款计划借得455亿美元。为在业务瘫痪之际保持市场秩序，Fed希望这个部门能继续存在下去，哪怕只有几天。
同一天，巴克莱开始与雷曼兄弟重新谈判。翌日，巴克莱同意出资15.4亿美元收购其北美业务。同时，它将偿还雷曼兄弟从美联储借的455亿美元，同时取得贷款抵押资产。美联储在此交易中未发生一分钱的损失。
在雷曼兄弟公司，福尔德在备忘录中向员工通报了交易。他说：我知道这么做让你们每个人都非常痛苦，不论是个人情感上还是经济上。对此我感到极度不安。
Carrick Mollenkamp / Susanne Craig / Jeffrey Mccracken / Jon Hilsenrath
The Public, Private Faces Of Lehman's Fall
2008年10月07日13:30
In the weeks before it collapsed, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. went to great lengths to conceal how fast it was careening toward the financial precipice.
The ailing securities firm quietly tapped the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve as financial lifelines. On Sept. 10, one day after Lehman executives calculated the firm needed at least $3 billion in fresh capital, the firm assured investors on a conference call it needed no new capital at all. Lehman said its massive real-estate portfolio was valued properly, but Wall Street executives who have seen it say it was overvalued by more than $10 billion. As hedge-fund clients began yanking their money from Lehman, the firm assured them it was on solid financial footing.
On Sept. 11, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. effectively ended Lehman's campaign to appear strong. In its capacity as a middleman between Lehman and its clients, J.P. Morgan knew more about Lehman's predicament than most outsiders, and it didn't like what it saw. J.P. Morgan demanded from Lehman $5 billion in additional collateral -- easy-to-sell securities to cover lending positions that J.P. Morgan's clients had with Lehman -- repeating an unmet request from a week earlier, people familiar with the situation say.
It was a knockout blow. That $5 billion collateral call, coupled with a huge outflow of money from Lehman's hedge-fund clients, so weakened the 158-year-old Wall Street firm that it sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection four days later.
During the credit crisis, financial firms have been squeezed between conflicting pressures: to tell the public the painful truth, but also not to ignite panic. The story of Lehman's desperate effort to survive -- pieced together from securities filings, bankruptcy-court documents and more than two dozen interviews with participants in the drama -- reveals for the first time how far Lehman went to save itself. The firm's behind-the-scenes maneuvering raises questions about whether it crossed the line into misleading clients and investors.
To an extraordinary degree, investment banks depend for their survival on trust -- from lenders and investors, from hedge funds and other big clients, and especially from other large banks that are their trading partners. Their businesses are so complex, their balance sheets so massive and opaque, that hardly anyone outside the tent can know for sure how much trouble a firm is in. When outsiders sense weakness, they are quick to bail out.
On Monday, the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee is holding hearings to examine the regulatory mistakes and financial excesses that led to Lehman's bankruptcy filing. Among those testifying will be Richard Fuld Jr., Lehman's chief executive officer.
FBI Inquiry
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has launched a preliminary inquiry into whether Lehman or its executives committed fraud by misrepresenting the firm's condition to investors. Prosecutors from the U.S. Attorney's office in New York's Eastern District are examining, among other things, whether Lehman executives misled investors by making upbeat comments to investors and research analysts on Sept. 10 -- five days before the firm filed for bankruptcy protection, according to people familiar with the investigation.
Former prosecutors say severe financial pressure can put executives at investment banks in a tough spot, given how important it is for them to maintain customer confidence.
'It's a dance all these executives do when your company is built on trust and you can't show weakness,' says Peter Henning, a former lawyer at the Justice Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission, who now teaches at Wayne State University law school in Detroit. 'But public statements of strength were used against' top executives at Enron Corp. by criminal prosecutors to show they were misleading investors, he notes. 'You can look like you are talking out of both sides of your mouth.'
Lehman's collapse was a decisive moment in the 13-month-old credit crisis. The government's decision not to bail out the firm set off a near panic among investors and lenders world-wide, forcing the U.S. to push through a historic rescue plan for the financial system.
Over the summer, Mr. Fuld came under pressure to replenish capital depleted by mounting real-estate losses. In August, as investors pushed down Lehman's stock, rumors began swirling that the firm was in trouble.
Mr. Fuld and his bankers contacted Bank of America Corp., MetLife Inc., HSBC Holdings PLC in the U.K., investors representing Dubai ruler Sheik Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, and China's main sovereign-wealth fund, China Investment Corp., people familiar with the matter say. The effort went nowhere. Spokespeople for the banks either declined to comment or weren't available.
Crunch Deepens
As the credit crunch deepened, the Fed had set up a new lending facility for investment banks. Although the central bank doesn't reveal who borrows from it, the market generally figures it out, and there's a stigma associated with it. Lehman didn't do so over the summer, because it didn't want to be seen as needing Fed money, says one person familiar with the matter.
Lehman went elsewhere, stepping up its borrowing from the European Central Bank. The borrowing, at least some of it by a Lehman operation in Frankfurt, drew no attention in the market. By the time Lehman sought bankruptcy protection, it owed between 8 billion and 9 billion. An ECB spokeswoman declined to comment.
As concerns about Lehman spread through the market, its executives began hearing from clients. None of them wanted to have money tied up with Lehman if it filed for bankruptcy protection. Christian Lawless, a senior vice president in Lehman's European mortgage operation, says he fielded numerous calls from investors seeking to pull out assets. 'You guys are financial professionals,' he recalls telling some skittish clients. 'Our balance sheet is better than ever.'
In early September, GLG Partners, a large London hedge fund in which Lehman holds a stake, grew increasingly concerned. In a series of calls, Mr. Fuld and other Lehman executives assured GLG managers that Lehman would survive. But managers at the hedge fund, which had been trimming exposure to Lehman for months, decided to move more assets out of the firm anyway.
Shortly before Labor Day, Lehman's talks to raise capital from the Korea Development Bank fell through. On Sept. 9, after that news surfaced, Lehman's stock plunged 45% -- its largest daily percentage decline ever.
Demanding Collateral
Lehman still had superior ratings on its bonds. J.P. Morgan, however, was growing concerned. As Lehman's 'clearing bank,' J.P. Morgan acted as the financial middleman between Lehman and its clients. Steven Black, co-CEO of J.P. Morgan's investment bank, phoned Mr. Fuld just after lunch that day. He told the Lehman chief that in order to protect itself and its clients, J.P. Morgan needed $5 billion in additional collateral -- over and above the $5 billion J.P. Morgan had demanded five days earlier, which had yet to be paid.
Mr. Fuld managed to persuade Mr. Black to settle for $3 billion right away, leaving the prior $5 billion request unresolved. Mr. Black dispatched two J.P. Morgan investment bankers to discuss a capital-raising plan.
Meanwhile, Lehman executives arranged a conference call for the next day to announce earnings ahead of schedule and to disclose plans for a restructuring. That evening, discussions with outside bankers about possible capital raising ended without any formal plan. The bankers counseled Lehman against holding the call, warning there were too many open questions about the firm's finances.
That evening, top Lehman executives discussed the need to raise between $3 billion and $5 billion to shore up capital by early 2009, according to one person familiar with the meeting. Documents that discussed this need were circulated to senior executives, this person says.
Early the next morning, Sept. 10, Lehman hosted the conference call for investors. The firm announced that it expected its largest quarterly loss ever, $3.9 billion, driven largely by declines in real-estate valuations. Mr. Fuld said the firm intended to sell a majority stake in its investment-management division and would cut its dividend.
Lehman executives didn't say anything about needing to raise capital.
Mike Mayo, a Deutsche Bank AG bank analyst, asked whether Lehman would need to raise $4 billion as part of the plan, according to a transcript of the call. Lehman's chief financial officer, Ian Lowitt, replied: 'We don't feel that we need to raise that extra amount.' At another point, Mr. Lowitt said: 'Our capital position at the moment is strong.'
Messrs. Fuld and Lowitt declined to comment. One Lehman executive says the firm determined sometime the prior night that additional capital wouldn't be needed because Lehman hoped to raise more money by selling additional assets.
By the following day, Sept. 11, the price of Lehman's credit-default swaps -- the cost to protect against losses on $10 million of its debt for five years -- had soared to $800,000 a year, from $219,000 at the end of May. Clients began calling and emailing Lehman to get their money out. Lehman scrambled to comply so as not to betray weakness.
But J.P. Morgan was worried about holding lending positions with Lehman if the firm collapsed. Jane Buyers Russo, head of J.P. Morgan's broker-dealer unit, phoned Lehman's treasurer, Paolo Tonucci. She told him Lehman would have to turn over the $5 billion in collateral that J.P. Morgan had asked for days earlier.
Fulfilling the request temporarily froze Lehman's computerized trading systems. It nearly left the firm with insufficient capital to fund its trading and other operations.
Lehman's unsecured creditors now say J.P. Morgan helped to spark a 'liquidity crisis.' J.P. Morgan calls that 'unfounded conjecture.'
Fed officials, who were watching Lehman closely, saw that lenders and clients were pulling back. They were growing more worried that Lehman wasn't going to make it.
On Friday afternoon, Sept. 12, credit-ratings firms warned they would downgrade Lehman's debt on Monday if it didn't raise fresh capital.
Inside Lehman, there was growing panic. So many customers called to withdraw money that it couldn't properly process the requests. The firm's cash-management system -- which each day is supposed to sweep up cash from offices such as London and redistribute it the next day -- couldn't handle the surge. Lehman's New York arm couldn't properly get money to London accounts, which left Lehman's main European arm, based in London, essentially broke by Monday. Some $5 billion that was supposed to get to Lehman's London operations or its counterparties didn't arrive by Monday, estimates PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, which was hired to help sort out the mess.
Surviving the Weekend
Fed officials worked at Lehman's headquarters with its executives to determine which of its assets weren't already pledged to other lenders, and could be used as collateral for a Fed loan. Officials were hoping to help the firm survive into the weekend. Lehman borrowed roughly $30 billion from the Fed, on an overnight basis, paying it back by Saturday, according to several people familiar with the matter. A Lehman executive says the firm didn't borrow from the Fed at that time.
The New York Fed arranged emergency discussions, which began on Friday night as Lehman's board consulted with bankers at Lazard Ltd. Lehman hoped to strike a deal to sell itself to Bank of America or Barclays PLC. Nevertheless, its lawyers began late Friday night to prepare a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing, in the event that it was needed.
The New York Fed summoned Wall Street executives to try to work out a solution to Lehman's dilemma. Neither Barclays nor Bank of America was interested in buying Lehman's commercial real-estate operations. The Fed asked executives from a group of firms, including Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Credit Suisse, to value Lehman's massive commercial-real-estate portfolio and to consider investing several billion dollars each to buy it.
The executives grilled Mark Walsh, then Lehman's commercial real-estate chief, according to several people who were there. They wanted to know why Lehman hadn't more aggressively 'marked down,' or cut in value, its $32.6 billion commercial-real-estate holdings, these people say. Securities firms are required to 'mark to market' their holdings, meaning to value them on their books at the level at which they could sell them right away.
Executives looking at Lehman's books were surprised by Lehman's high valuations on real-estate assets. Two Wall Street executives who reviewed Lehman real-estate documents say they believe the firm's real-estate valuations are roughly 35% higher than they should be.
Some of its European real-estate loans raised particular concern. According to a Lehman document reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, Lehman 'marked' some European securities backed by real-estate loans at 97.9% of par value, or nearly 98 cents on the dollar. Lehman valued similar U.S. assets at 56 cents on the dollar. While the European market for such securities has been slightly better than the U.S. market, it has also been hammered by the credit crisis.
These valuations are important to thousands of Lehman creditors who are owed tens of billions of dollars. These creditors may hold that real estate as collateral, or hope to see it sold, perhaps to the federal government through the recently approved bailout plan.
Lehman believes its real-estate portfolio is properly valued. On the Sept. 10 conference call, Mr. Lowitt, the CFO, said the firm's recent sales of real-estate assets had been 'in and around our marks.'
By Sunday, Sept. 14, Fed officials believed Lehman had run out of options. Neither Barclays nor Bank of America would commit to a deal unless the government agreed to finance a transaction that would almost surely cost the taxpayers money. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson insisted he wouldn't do such a deal, and Fed officials didn't feel they had a mandate to do one on their own. Meanwhile, insurance giant American International Group Inc. was teetering.
At a late-afternoon meeting with Lehman and its lawyers, officials from the New York Fed and elsewhere delivered a message: Lehman must file for bankruptcy.
Working with bankruptcy lawyer Harvey Miller, the firm put together its filing in about five hours. Shortly after midnight Sunday, Lehman sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.
Mr. Lawless, the Lehman mortgage executive, emailed clients that night. 'Words cannot express the sadness in the franchise that has been destroyed over the last few weeks, but I wanted to assure you that we will reappear in one form or another-stronger than ever.'
The bankruptcy threw into disarray tens of billions of dollars of cash and securities entrusted to Lehman by hundreds of hedge funds that were customers of the firm's prime brokerage, which loans money and stock to hedge funds and processes their trades. Some of the world's best-known hedge funds, including D.E. Shaw & Co. and Och-Ziff Capital Management., have assets tied up in Lehman and its subsidiaries.
'I've seen some pretty significant and difficult situations, but nothing like this,' says Tony Lomas, a PricewaterhouseCoopers partner.
That Monday, Lehman's broker-dealer arm, which had not itself sought bankruptcy protection, borrowed $45.5 billion from the Fed's special lending facility for investment banks. The central bank wanted to keep the unit going for at least a few days to try to preserve order in the markets while the operation unwound.
That same day, Barclays restarted talks with Lehman. The following day, the U.K. bank agreed to buy the bulk of Lehman's North American business, for $1.54 billion. To seal the deal, Barclays agreed to pay off the $45.5 billion loan that Lehman had gotten from the Fed, and to take from the Fed the collateral that backed the loan. The Fed didn't lose any money on the deal.
Back at Lehman, Mr. Fuld informed employees about the deal in a note. 'I know that this has been very painful on all of you, both personally and financially,' he said. 'For this, I feel horrible.'
作者：游客 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
标签: 雷曼,Lehman,
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