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The Other Reason for Warren Buffett’s Success
2008年11月04日

Wouldn’t it be nice, in this miserable market, to be Warren Buffett? Fortunately, a cottage industry has sprung up to teach investors how to emulate the master. Unfortunately, you might as well try to catch a bolt of lightning in a paper cup.

For the first two decades of his career, Mr. Buffett built the bulk of his fortune through his investing prowess, producing one of the best long-term track records of any money manager in history. More recently, however, Mr. Buffett has succeeded not through investing prowess alone, but also through exclusive deals that have come to him because of it.

Only a part of Mr. Buffett’s market-beating performance has come from stock-picking. Even more of his edge has been generated by the operating subsidiaries of his Berkshire Hathaway Inc., like Benjamin Moore paint and Geico insurance. ‘There’s no question about it,’ Mr. Buffett told me during the week. ‘Certainly over the last decade at least,’ the earnings of Berkshire’s operating businesses ‘have grown at a much faster rate than the [value of the] marketable securities per share.’

It is a lot harder than it used to be to measure just how good a stock-picker Mr. Buffett is. When I asked him if he knew how well Berkshire’s stock portfolio has done in recent years, he answered: ‘I’ve no idea what the rate of return would be. But, knowing myself how hard it would be to do the calculations right, I’m suspicious of anybody’s numbers.’

An outsider, then, can barely get in the ballpark. Since the end of 1988, Berkshire’s stock portfolio has grown from $3.56 billion to $69.51 billion. That is a spectacular average annual increase of 16.5%, far surpassing the 10.5% annualized return of the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index. Of course, this calculation is only a crude approximation, since it ignores the cash that Mr. Buffett added in — and moved out — along the way.

Over the same period, the growth in Berkshire’s book value per share, which reflects all of Mr. Buffett’s activities, not just his stock-picking, was 19.9%.

In other words, Mr. Buffett’s skill at picking publicly traded stocks pales alongside the value he has added to the company through other means.

As recently as 1995, 73.5% of Berkshire’s total assets consisted of a portfolio of publicly traded stocks that (at least in theory) any investor could have replicated. As of June 30, though, Berkshire’s stockholdings made up just 25% of its total assets.

Mr. Buffett’s stock picks used to drive the train; lately, they are more like the caboose. He has been buying private firms outright and landing ’sweetheart’ deals in public companies.

Since the beginning of 2006, Berkshire has spent nearly $17 billion buying private companies lock, stock and barrel, including an Israeli cutting-tool maker and a distributor of electronic components.

Meanwhile, on the sweetheart front, in 2008 alone Mr. Buffett has sunk $5 billion into Goldman Sachs Group, $3 billion into General Electric Co., $3 billion into Dow Chemical Co. and $6.5 billion into the merger of Mars Inc. with Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. — all with preferential terms.

Twenty years ago, Mr. Buffett struck similar bargains with companies whose quality ranged from purebred Gillette to mutts like Champion International, Salomon Brothers and USAir Group. His results were mixed. The lesson here is that even Mr. Buffett learns lessons. In his latest round of sweetheart deals, he gets a generous upside and virtually eliminates any downside, a ‘heads I win, tails I win’ structure that other investors can only dream about.

Whether he buys stocks in what he calls the ‘auction market’ or private businesses in the ‘negotiated market,’ Mr. Buffett tries to secure a margin of safety. That term, defined by his mentor Benjamin Graham, means that the price is so far below a business’s underlying value that severe loss is improbable.

‘We do try to buy our businesses like we buy our stocks,’ Mr. Buffett told me, ‘and buy our stocks like we buy our businesses.’ By that he means, among other things, that he wants to understand how the enterprise generates cash, how well-managed it is and whether its customers would stay loyal even if it raised the prices of its goods or services. Note carefully: None of these factors are contingent on the current price of the stock.

‘Being a businessman makes me a better investor and being an investor makes me a better businessman,’ Mr. Buffett explained. ‘Most businessmen limit themselves to their own field, and most investors don’t really think about businesses. And many businessmen are semi-oblivious to the yardsticks other people use outside that field. I’m always comparing everything to everything else. The question I want to answer is. ‘Where do we get the most for our money in something we can understand?'’

‘I prefer, and [Berkshire Vice Chairman] Charlie [Munger] prefers, the permanent ownership of [private] businesses,’ Mr. Buffett added. ‘That’s been my focus for well over 20 years. But it’s just that sometimes, marketable securities are so much more compelling.’ Mr. Buffett didn’t say whether he thinks now is one of those times, but he did state publicly earlier this month that ‘I’ve been buying American stocks.’

Any investor who picks stocks can try to think like Mr. Buffett and, as he pointed out, ‘the individual actually has an advantage over us, because their costs of buying and selling [stocks] are a helluva lot less than ours.’ But that advantage applies only if you actually can think like Mr. Buffett. Above all, there is much more to his success than stock-picking alone. Throughout Mr. Buffett’s long career, he has changed tack repeatedly. At this point, he is on a course most investors will no longer be able to follow.

Jason Zweig

巴菲特成功的另一个原因

在一片惨淡的市场要是能成为沃伦•巴菲特(Warren Buffett)式的人物岂不妙哉？幸运的是，已经出现了教投资者如何追随这位大师的行当。但不幸的是，追随他实在是太难了。

在他事业的前二十年里, 巴菲特通过自己的投资能力积累了大部分财富，打造了有史以来最棒的投资经理的长期纪录。不过，巴菲特最近的成功并非仅凭投资能力，而是凭借因这一点而落到他手上的交易。

巴菲特超越市场的业绩只有一部分来自选股的成果。他的成就更大一部分源于Berkshire Hathaway Inc.所营运的子公司，如Benjamin Moore涂料公司和Geico保险公司。巴菲特上周对我说，这是毫无疑问的，至少在过去的十年中，Berkshire经营的业务增长比有价证券每股股价的涨幅要快得多。

这比以前衡量巴菲特有多精于选股要难得多。当我问他知不知道Berkshire的股票投资组合近年的业绩如何时，他回答说，我不知道回报率是多少，但我自己深知要计算出回报率有多难，因此我对任何人提供的数字都表示怀疑。

这么说来，外行的估计肯定准不了。自1988年底以来，Berkshire的股票投资组合已经从35.6亿美元增长到695.1亿美元，年均增长率达到可观的16.5%，远远超出标准普尔500指数10.5%的年均收益率。当然，这个数字只是粗略的估计，因为它忽略了巴菲特在此期间所增减的资金。

同一时期，反映巴菲特所有投资活动而不光是选股的Berkshire每股帐面价值增长了19.9%。

这也就是说，比起巴菲特通过其他方式为公司增添的价值，他的选股能力黯然失色。

就是在1995年，Berkshire的总资产还有73.5%由股票投资组合构成，至少在理论上，任何投资者都同样可以实现这样的结构。但截至今年6月30日，Berkshire的持股占总资产比例仅为25%。

巴菲特所挑选的股票曾经是推动公司增长的“火车头”；而最近它们却更像是可有可无的部分。他一直在直接收购私营公司，并与上市公司进行获利丰厚的交易。

自2006年初以来，Berkshire已经斥资近170亿美元收购大量私营公司，其中包括一家以色列切割工具生产商和一家电子元件销售商。

与此同时，在获利丰厚的交易方面，仅2008年，巴菲特就向高盛集团(Goldman Sachs Group)投入了50亿美元、向通用电气(General Electric Co.)投入了30亿美元、陶氏化学公司(Dow Chemical Co.)30亿美元，还在玛氏公司(Mars Inc.)与箭牌糖类有限公司(WM. Wrigley Jr. Co.)的并购交易中投入了65亿美元，这些投资都获得了十分优惠的条件。

二十年前，巴菲特也进行过许多类似交易，交易对象从血统纯正的吉列(Gillette)到Champion International、所罗门兄弟(Salomon Brothers)和USAir Group等杂牌军应有尽有。这些投资的成果有好有坏。我们从中学到的教训是即便是巴菲特也有失手的时候。在最新一轮交易中，他基本上都是稳赚不赔，实现了其他投资者梦寐以求的赢得彻头彻尾的模式。

无论是在他所称的“拍卖市场”买进股票还是在“议价市场”收购私营企业，巴菲特都试图保持一个安全边际。巴菲特的导师本杰明•格雷汉姆(Benjamin Graham)对“安全边际”的定义是，收购价远远低于一个企业的基本价值，因此不可能出现严重亏损。

巴菲特对我说，我们确实试图像买进股票一样收购企业，也像收购企业一样买股票。他这话的一个含义是，他想了解这家企业如何实现收入、管理水平怎么样及其在提高产品或服务价格的情况下客户是否依然保持忠诚。请注意：现行股价并不反映这些因素。

巴菲特解释说，做企业家的经历令我成为更好的投资者，而当投资者又让我成为更好的企业家。大多数企业家都局限在自己的领域里，而大多数投资者都没有真正去考虑商业方面的东西。许多企业家都不太明白自己的领域之外的准绳。我总是将所有的东西进行比较。我想弄清楚的问题是：我们怎么将资金投向自己所理解的方面，从而实现最大回报？

巴菲特还说，Berkshire副董事长查理•芒格(Charlie Munger)和他自己都喜欢永久性地拥有私营企业。20多年来，这一点一直是他最关注的。只不过有时候，有价证券的收益更引人注目。巴菲特没有说明他是不是认为现在也是那种时候之一，但他本月早些时候的确曾公开表示自己在买进美股。

任何投资者在选股时都可以试着像巴菲特一样思考，而且正如他所指出的那样：散户投资者实际上更有优势，因为他们买卖股票的成本远远低于我们。但只有当你真正能像巴菲特一样思考时，这种优势才有意义。最重要的是，他的成功绝不仅仅限于选股。在巴菲特漫长的职业生涯中，他曾反复改变策略。眼下，他的成功之路是大多数投资者所无法追随的。